Regulation of the Sale of Property
Insurance by Savings and Loan Associations
Savings and loan associations,' the nation's primary source of
residential credit,2 nearly always precondition approval of a mortgage upon the borrower's purchase of property insurance 3 on the
real estate securing the loan. 4 Association personnel frequently
apply subtle pressures to channel that insurance purchase through
an insurance agency owned by the officers or directors of the association, 5 a practice that may entail the appropriation of a
corporate opportunity. 6 This phenomenon is due in part to restrictions under state law that may prevent the association itself
from acting as an insurance agent.7 The restrictions fall into four
general categories: statutes providing general qualifications for
insurance agents; antirebate statutes; controlled business statutes;
and primary occupation statutes.
This comment first surveys existing state regulation to determine the situations in which savings and loan associations or af1. There are two types of savings and loan associations: mutual and stock. A mutual
association obtains its capital from its depositors, who are also its owners. In a stock association, the stockholders contribute capital in exchange for an ownership interest in
the association. The stock association's owners need not be saver-depositors and frequently are not. Twenty-one states permit the chartering of stock associations. ABA
COMMITTEE ON SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS, HANDBOOK OF SAVINGS AND LOAN LAW

12-14 (1973). At the end of 1973, mutual associations represented eighty-seven percent of
all associations and held approximately seventy-nine percent of the industry's assets. U.S.
SAVINGS AND LOAN LEAGUE, 1974 SAVINGS AND LOAN FACT BOOK 60 [hereinafter cited as
FACT B6OK].

2. At the end of 1973, savings and loan mortgages accounted for 44.3 percent of the
total outstanding residential mortgages. Other significant sources were commercial banks,
life insurance companies, and mutual savings banks. FACT BOOK, supra note 1, at 35.
3. Property insurance usually includes protection against one or more of the following
hazards: fire, lightning, smoke, windstorm, water leakage, hail, riots, rain, earthquakes,
and explosions. McCullough, Property Insurance, 1963 INS. L.J. 75, 76-77.
4. The most frequently required protection is fire insurance. Herman, Conflict of Interest in the Savings and Loan Industry, in 2 STUDY OF THE SAVINGS AND LOAN INDUSTRY 847

(I. Friend ed. 1969). The right of an association to demand this coverage is well established.
See Eddy v. Home Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 60 Cal. App. 2d 42, 45, 140 P.2d 156, 158
(1943).
5. See Herman, supra note 4, at 854-55.
6. See Goodman v. Perpetual Bldg. Ass'n, 320 F. Supp. 20 (D.D.C. 1970); Kerrigan v.
Unity Sav. Ass'n, 58 Il1. 2d 20. 317 N.E.2d 39 (1974); cf. Diedrick v. Helm, 217 Minn. 483,
14 N.W.2d 913 (1944).
7. An agent represents a specific company under an agency contract. See Kimball &
Jackson, The Regulation of Insurance Marketing, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 141, 167 (1961).
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filiated agencies" are directly prohibited from selling property
insurance and those in which they would be indirectly prohibited
from doing so under arguably applicable insurance statutes. The
comment argues that the latter should be construed to permit savings and loans to qualify as property insurance agents. It then
analyzes the effects of allowing savings and loans to act as insurance agents and concludes that there are strong policy reasons for
eliminating direct prohibitions of that activity.
I.

EXISTING STATUTES

The power of a savings and loan association to act as an insurance agent is initially a function of the source of its charter, since
the powers granted to federally chartered associations by the
federal government may differ from those granted to state chartered associations by the states. In addition, regulation of the sale
of property insurance by a savings and loan association may vary
depending on whether the sale is made by the association itself, by
a service corporation in which the association has invested, or by
a subsidiary of a savings and loan holding company. Thus, analysis of existing regulation of the sale property insurance by savings
and loan associations must identify both the source of the charter
and the identity of the sales agent.
A.

State Chartered Savings and Loan Associations
1. The Association as an Insurance Agent. Although most savings
and loan association charters 9 do not expressly grant the power to
sell insurance, 10 courts have held that an association's incidental
powers-those reasonably necessary to accomplish an association's
express objectivesn"-include the power to sell property insurance
8. The term affiliated agencies will be used in this comment to refer to service corporations, subsidiaries of savings and loan holding companies, and agencies owned by
officers and directors of the association.
9. State chartered savings and loan associations are nearly always in corporate form.
In re Puget Sound Say. & Loan Ass'n, 49 F.2d 922, 923-24 (W.D. Wash. 1931); Orlando v.
Nix, 171 La. 176, 179, 129 So. 810, 811 (1930); Sundt v. Mutual Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 37
N.M. 1, 4, 16 P.2d 394, 395 (1932); 1 W. FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 76 (rev. ed.
1963); Prather, Savings Accounts in Savings and Loan Associations, 15 Bus. LAW. 44, 51 (1959).
10. Conversation with Mr. Donald Weeks, Assistant Counsel, U.S. Savings and Loan
League, 1974.
11. All state chartered savings and loan associations possess general incidental powers,
either by specific legislation, W. PRATHER, SAVINGS ACCOUNTS 606 (4th ed. 1970); see, e.g.,
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 665.214(12) (Supp. 1974); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 6020-101(13) (Supp.
1974), or under well established judicial doctrine, see American Cas. Co. v. Dakota Tractor
& Equip. Co., 234 F. Supp. 606, 610 (D.N.D. 1964); Greenwich Water Co. v. Adams, 145
Conn. 535, 541, 144 A.2d 323, 326 (1958); W. PRATHER, supra at 606.
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on the collateral securing a loan. 1 2 Nevertheless, several state statutes may prevent the savings and loan association from acting as
an insurance agent. State insurance agent licensing statutes in five
states, for example, specifically prohibit a savings and loan from
obtaining a license to sell property insurance, 1 3 and eight others
require the insurance agent applicant to be a natural person.' 4 In
the remaining jurisdictions, however, savings and loans can apparently qualify under statutes regulating the types of parties that
15
may become agents.
State antirebate statutes constitute another source of licensing
regulation. These statutes, which exist in thirty-eight states, prohibit the payment of rebates or other consideration to induce the
12. Goodman v. Perpetual Bldg. Ass'n, 320 F. Supp. 20, 27-28 (D.D.C. 1970); Kerrigan v. Unity Say. Ass'n, 58 Ill. 2d 20, 25-27, 317 N.E.2d 39, 42-43 (1974); Chicago Bldg.
Soc'y v. Crowell, 65 Ill. 453, 457-58 (1872).
13. CAL. FIN. CODE § 5500 (West 1968); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24A, § 1514-A (1974);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 175, § 174E (Supp. 1974); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 384:16-b(II)
(Supp. 1973); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4811 (Supp. 1974).
14. ALA. CODE tit. 28A, § 114 (Supp. 1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 636.731(1) (1972); GA.
CODE ANN. § 56-802b (1971); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-239 (1973); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 375.016(1)
(1968); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:22-6.1 (1970); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-12-2(a) (1972); Wis.
STAT. ANN. §§ 209.04(1), (6) (Supp. 1974).
15. Twenty-eight states allow a corporation to be an insurance agent. ALAsKA STAT.
§ 21.27.140 (1970); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-282 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-2802
(1966); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-72 (Supp. 1974); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 1702
(Spec. Insurance Pamphlet 1971); HAWAII REV. LAWS § 431-368 (1968); IDAHO CODE
§ 41-1021 (Supp. 1974); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, § 1065.37 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974); IND.
ANN. STAT. § 39-4501 (1965); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.9-020 (1972); LA. REV. STAT.
§ 22-1161 (1959); MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 168(d) (1972); MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
§ 40-3302 (1947); NEV. REV. STAT. § 683A.030 (1973); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-5-23 (1953);
N.Y. INS. LAW § 115(2) (McKinney 1966); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-39.4 (1965); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 3905.01, 3905.05 (Anderson 1970); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 1301 (1958); ORE.
REV. STAT. § 744.135 (1974); PA. STAT. tit. 40, § 231 (1971); S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-231.1
(Supp. 1973); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 58-30-1 (1967); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. art.
21.14, § 3(a) (Supp. 1974); UTAH CODE ANN. § 31-17-9(2) (Supp. 1973); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 38.1-280 (1970); WASH. REV. CODE § 48.17.090 (1961); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 26.1-154
(1967). But it should be noted that Nevada and New York prohibit a subsidiary that provides services for a savings and loan from selling property insurance. NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 673.2765(1) (1973); N.Y. INS. LAW § 7-b (McKinney Supp. 1974). It is unlikely that a
savings and loan association could qualify as an insurance agent in Nevada and New
York within the scope of the term "corporations"; otherwise, an association would be
prohibited from selling insurance through a subsidiary, but permitted to do so directly.
Although nine other states permit only "persons" to qualify for a license, each defines
that term to include corporations. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-1-19, 135-1-2(8) (1963);
IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 515.124 (1949), 4.1(13) (1967); MicH. STAT. ANN. §§ 2.212(12) (1969),
24.11201 (1972); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60A.02, subd. 7 (1968), 645.44, subd. 6 (1947);
Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 1-3-39, 83-17-1 (1972); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-330 (1974); N.D. CENT.
CODE §§ 1-01-28 (1959), 26-17-.01.3 (1970); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 27-3-1 (1968),
43-3-6 (1970); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 1-305(14) (1971), 56-902 (1968).
The District of Columbia has an express provision allowing a savings and loan association to be an insurance agent. D.C. CODE ENCYCL. ANN. § 35-1336 (1968).
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purchase of property insurance. 16 These statutes restrict competition by prohibiting agents from offering to return to policyholders
a portion of the commissions they have earned as an inducement
to purchase the insurance through them.' 7 It can be argued that
because a savings and loan association acting as an insurance agent
might distribute a portion of its commissions, through interest
payments to depositors or dividends to stockholders, to some persons who have purchased insurance from it, the savings and loan
would violate the antirebate statute.' 8 Establishing a violation of
the statute, however, would require proof that the alleged rebate
actually induced the purchase of insurance through the savings
and loan association, rather than through another agent.' 9 It is
unlikely that the uncertain prospect of a minimal and diluted
increase in distributed earnings would provide the requisite in20
ducement.
Controlled business statutes, another type of antirebate statute,2 ' prohibit the licensing of an applicant who intends to write
16.

Nineteen states have general antirebate statutes covering property as well as

other types of insurance. CAL. INS. CODE § 750 (West 1972); GA. CODE ANN. § 56-704(8)(a)

(1971); HAWAII REV. LAWS § 431-643(8) (1968); IDAHO CODE § 41-1314(1) (Supp. 1974);
IND. ANN. STAT. § 39-5304(8)(a) (Supp. 1974); Ky. REV. STAT. § 304.12-090(1) (1970);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, § 182 (1970); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 724.08(1) (1968); NEB.

REV. STAT. § 44-361 (1974); N.H. REV. STAT.ANN. § 402:39 (1968); N.Y. INS. LAW § 1881(1)
(McKinney 1966); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-44.5 (1965); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 12-4(8)(a)
(Supp. 1974); ORE. REV. STAT. § 746.045 (1974); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 275 (1971);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 31-27-14 (1966); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4724(8)(A) (Supp. 1974);

VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-52(8)(a) (1970); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.30.140(1) (1961). An
additional nineteen states have antirebate laws specifically covering property insurance.

ALA. CODE tit. 28A, § 151(4) (Supp. 1973); ALASKA STAT. § 21.36.120(a) (1974); ARM. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 20-451 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-3019(1)(1966); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.

18, § 2312(a) (Supp. 1970); D. C. CODE ENCYCL. ANN. § 35-12-1 (Supp. 1974); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 626.965(1) (1972); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, § 1065.18-29 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 515A.16 (Supp. 1974); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-941 (1973); ME. REV.

STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2162(1) (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 226(a) (1972); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 83-3-33

(1972) (fire insurance);

MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 40-3512(1)

(1961); NEV. REV. STAT. § 686A.130(1) (1973); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26-29-15 (1970); TEX.
INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.14(22) (1963); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-11-11 (1972); WYO. STAT.
ANN. 26.1-254(a) (1967). Illegal rebating is usually grounds for revocation of an agent's
license. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-316(A)(2) (Supp. 1974); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.

73, § 1065.49(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974); MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 175(1) (1972).
17. See, e.g., Arcim Corp. v. Pink, 253 App. Div. 428, 429, 2 N.Y.S.2d 709, 711 (1938),
aff'd, 280 N.Y. 721, 21 N.E.2d 213 (1939); Moser v. Pantages, 96 Wash. 65, 69, 164 P.
768, 769 (1917); E. PATTERSON, THE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER IN THE UNITED STATES 30709, 312 (1927). See also Smith v. Kleinschmidt, 57 Mont. 237, 245, 187 P. 894, 896 (1920).
18.

Cf. Goodman v. Perpetual Bldg. Ass'n, 320 F. Supp. 20, 35 (D.D.C. 1970); People

ex rel. Troxell v. Baylor, 15 I1. App. 3d 815, 819-20, 305 N.E.2d 15, 19 (1973).
19.
20.

See authorities cited note 17 supra.
See Goodman v. Perpetual Bldg. Ass'n, 320 F. Supp. 20, 35 (D.D.C. 1970).

21.

Kimball & Jackson, supra note 7, at 149.
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or place more than a designated percentage of his insurance on
controlled business,2 2 which is usually broadly defined to include
insurance sales on the property of the agent, his relatives, his employees or employer, or of members, officers, and directors if the
agent is an organization. These statutes create an irrebuttable
presumption of illegal rebating when more than the designated
percentage of an agent's insurance sales are to controlled parties.2 3
The purpose of these statutes, like that of antirebate statutes, is to
minimize the number of licenses granted to applicants that intend
to obtain insurance for themselves or persons or organizations
beneficially connected with them at effective prices lower than
those stated in the policies. 24 Since the diluted return of insurance
commissions through distributions of earnings by a savings and
22. Thirty-seven states have enacted controlled business statutes. ALA. CODE tit. 28A,
§ 120(7) (Supp. 1974); ALASKA STAT. § 21.27.030 (1966); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-290(7)
(1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-2810(1)(h) (1966); CAL. INS. CODE § 760 (West 1972); COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 72-1-60(1) (Supp. 1967); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-72 (1958);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 1710(b) (Supp. 1970); D.C. CODE ENCYCL. ANN. § 35-1340(e)(f)
(1968); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 626.730 (1972); GA. CODE ANN. 56-804b(1)(b) (1971); HAWAII
REV. LAws § 431-366(a) (1968); IDAHO CODE § 41-1033(2) (Supp. 1974); ILL. ANN. STAT.

ch. 73, § 1065.55 (Smith-Hurd 1965); IND. ANN. STAT. § 39-4503(f) (1965) (no percentage
designated); KY. REV. STAT. § 304.9-100 (1972); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1167(C)(8)
(Supp. 1974); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24A, §§ 1514, 1603(6) (1974); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 83-17-205(3) (1973); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 40-3308(h) (Supp. Vol. 3, 1961); NEB.

REV. STAT. § 44-361.01 (1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:22-6.9(h) (1970) (no percentage designated); N.Y. INs. LAW § 114(4) (McKinney 1966); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-41(6) (1965);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3905.01 (Anderson 1970) (no percentage designated); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 1309(7) (Supp. 1974) (no percentage designated); ORE. REV. STAT.

§ 746.065 (1974); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 27-3-3 (1968) (no percentage designated);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-242 (1962); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN.
CODE ANN. § "56-912(B) (1968); TEX. INS. CODE art. 21.14, §
CODE ANN. § 31-17-23 (1953); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-311(7)
ANN. § 48.17.080 (1961); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-12-2(d)

§ 58-30-38 (1967); TENN.
(3)(b) (Supp. 1974); UTAH
(1970); WASH. REV. CODE
(1972); Wvo. STAT. ANN.

§ 26.1-163(b)(c) (1967). See Kimball & Jackson, supra note 7, at 149.
23.

See, e.g.,

CAL. INS. CODE § 760 (West 1972); CONN. GEN.

STAT. ANN. § 38-72

(1969).
24. Goodman v. Perpetual Bldg. Ass'n, 320 F. Supp. 20, 33-34 (D.D.C. 1970); Quetnick v. McConnell, 154 Cal. App. 2d 112, 116-17, 315 P.2d 718, 721 (1957); Florida Ass'n
of Ins. Agents v. Larson, 155 Fla. 13, 14, 19 So.2d 414, 415 (1944). See also DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 18, § 1710(a) (Supp. 1971); IDAHO CODE § 41-1033(1) (Supp. 1974).

A minority view is that the purpose of controlled business statutes is to prevent the diversion of insurance business from full-time agents by part-time agents who gain access to
insurance purchasers through the sale of other products and services. See Jarus v.
Robinson, 71 Ohio L. Abs. 510, 512, 133 N.E.2d 441, 442-43 (C.P. 1954) (real estate
broker); Motors Ins. Corp. v. Robinson, 62 Ohio L. Abs. 58, 69, 71-72, 106 N.E.2d 572,
579, 580 (C.P. 1951), aff'd, 62 Ohio L. Abs. 72, 106 N.E.2d 581 (1951), appeal dismissed
per curiam, 344 U.S. 803 (1952) (automobile dealer). See also Board of Ins. Comm'rs v.
Duncan, 174 S.W.2d 326, 328-29 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943), which states that the purpose
of the controlled business statute in question is to preserve free choice in the selection of
insurance agents. It is arguable that in the jurisdictions accepting the minority rule, it
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loan association would probably not induce the purchase of insurance from the association, a controlled business statute's presumption of illegal rebating is inappropriate in the savings and
loan context. 25 In fact, twelve states have enacted provisions that
specifically exempt insurance sales generated by mortgage transactions from their controlled business statutes. 26 In states without
such provisions, controlled business statutes should be construed
to allow a savings and loan association to act as an insurance
27
agent.
Finally, two states have enacted statutes that prohibit the licensing
of an applicant that has no intention of deriving a major portion
of its income from insurance sales. 28 A savings and loan association is apparently unable to qualify for an insurance agent license
in states that have enacted these primary occupation statutes.2 9
would be proper to deny a savings and loan a license under a controlled business statute,
since it would be especially easy for the savings and loan to divert insurance sales to itself. On the uniquely advantageous access that savings and loans have to borrowers, see
text and notes at notes 66 & 69 infra.
25. "[A]ny benefits, direct or indirect, to the individual members of the savings and
loan association who pay the insurance premiums are so remote as to be inconsequential."
Goodman v. Perpetual Bldg. Ass'n, 320 F. Supp. 20, 34 (D.D.C. 1970) (construing the
District of Columbia controlled business statute).
26.

ARiM.

REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-290(7) (1956);

7

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 1 10(e)

(Supp. 1970); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 626.730 (1970); Ky. REV. STAT. § 304.9-100(4)(b) (1968);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 1514(4)(B) (1974); MISS. CODE ANN. § 83-17-205(3)
(1973);

OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 1309(7) (Supp. 1974); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN.

§ 58-30-40 (1967); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-912(B) (1968); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4795(b)
(Supp. 1974); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-12-2(d) (1972); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 26.1-163(e)(ii)
(1967).
27. A number of state controlled business statutes do not define terms like "association" and "member." See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 760 (West 1972); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 72-1-60(2)(b) (Supp. 1967); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-72 (Supp. 1974); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 56-801a(9) (Supp. 1974); IDAHO CODE § 41-1033(2) (Supp. 1974); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73,
§ 1065.55 (Smith-Hurd 1965); N.Y. INS. LAW § 114(4) (McKinney 1966); ORE. REV. STAT.
§ 746.065 (1974); UTAH CODE ANN. § 31-17-23 (1953); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.17.080
(1961). To interpret these terms to include savings and loan associations and their borrowers and depositors would mean that a savings and loan association could qualify for a
license only if it expected to write less than the designated percentage-for example,
thirty-three and one-third percent in Illinois-of its insurance on the property or risks of
borrowers and depositors-an unlikely commercial prospect. See People ex rel. Troxell v.
Baylor, 15 Ill. App. 3d 815, 819, 305 N.E.2d 15, 18 (1973); Kerrigan v. Unity Sav. Ass'n, 11
Ill. App. 3d 766, 772, 297 N.E.2d 699, 703 (1973), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 58 Il1. 2d
20, 317 N.E.2d 39 (1974). Of course, there is no reason to interpret these undefined terms
to include savings and loan associations and their borrowers and depositors if one accepts
the majority (antirebate) interpretation of the purpose of controlled business regulation.
See text and note at note 24 supra.
28. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, §§ 168(a), (d) (1972); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17 :22-6.9(g)
(1970).
29. See Goodman v. Perpetual Bldg. Ass'n, 320 F. Supp. 20, 36 (D.D.C. 1970) (construing Maryland statute). The New Jersey statute excludes from the determination of an
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In summary, state chartered savings and loan associations are
directly prohibited from acting as insurance agents in fourteen
states.3 0 Antirebate and controlled business statutes, although they
arguably prohibit such activity indirectly in other states, should
not be construed to do so.
2. Investment in a Service Corporation that Functions as an Insurance Agent. Several states have enacted legislation that authorizes

state chartered savings and loan associations to invest in service
corporations that perform a variety of clerical, accounting, and
related services. 3 1 This legislation usually enumerates several activities that a service corporation may engage in without authoriapplicant's primary occupation consideration of any portion of the agent's business
having a connection with a corporation "whose principal business is lending of money."
But an applicant for an agent's license must also be a natural person under New Jersey
law, and a savings and loan association could thus not qualify. See N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 17:22-6.1 (1970).
30. The fourteen states include the five that specifically prohibit savings and loans
from obtaining licenses, the eight that require applicants to be natural persons, and the
two that have enacted primary occupation statutes, of which New Jersey also has enacted
a natural person applicant requirement.
31. Seventeen states have enacted statutes expressly authorizing investment in service "corporations." ARMz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-446(5) (1974); CAL. FIN. CODE § 6702.1
(West 1968); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-178(p) (1958); HAWAII REV. LAWS § 407-95 (Supp.
1971); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 706(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974); IND. STAT. ANN.
§ 28-1-21-2(1) (1973y; I0WA CODE ANN. § 534.19(15) (Supp. 1974); MD.ANN. CODE art. 23,
§ 161z(b)(2) (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 369.219(6) (Supp. 1974); NEB. REV. STAT. § 8-320-01
(1970); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304:16-b(I) (Supp. 1973); N.Y. BANKING LAW § 379-a
(McKinney 1966); N.D. CENT. CODE § 7-02-13 (Supp. 1973); OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1151.34(E) (Anderson 1968); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 6020-162(n) (Supp. 1974); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 8-612 (Supp. 1974); VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-195.34(e) (1973). Nine states
permit a savings and loan to invest in noncorporate service organizations as well as
service corporations. ALASKA STAT. § 06.30.610(9) (1962); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 665.361(3)
(Supp. 1974); LA. STAT. ANN. § 6.731(L) (Supp. 1974); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 167, § 51B
(1970); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 23.540(352) (1971); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 51A.35(b) (1970);
TENN. CODE ANN.

§

45-1404(c)(1) (Supp. 1974); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 852a, § 5.11

(1964); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 215.13(26)(f) (Supp. 1974). This comment will use the term
service corporation to refer to both service corporations and service organizations.
Several states have also enacted "tie-in" statutes that define the investment powers
of state savings and loan associations according to the investment powers that can be exercised by a federal association domiciled in that state. See Harth & Weeks, Statutory Lending Powers of State Associations, 36 LEG. BULL. 179-447 (U.S. Say. & Loan League 1970)
(analyzing the thirty-two tie-in statutes on record in 1970); TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-1409
(Supp. 1974). It is important to note that these statutes add nothing to the preexisting
authority of state associations to invest in service corporations that sell insurance, because federal statutes authorize federal associations to invest in service corporations only
when an association chartered by the state in which the federal association is domiciled
is permitted to do so under state law. See Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1464(c) (1970); McCarran-Ferguson Insurance Regulation Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011 et
seq. (1970) (McCarran-Ferguson Act); text and notes at notes 43-63 infra. This analysis is
consistent with the purpose underlying state savings and loan "tie-in" legislation: the
preservation of a relationship of competitive equality between state and federal associa-
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zation from the savings and loan commissioner.3 2 Although seven
states' statutes expressly exclude the sale of property insurance
from those activities,3 3 none of the others expressly authorizes
service corporations to sell insurance. Each statute, however, confers discretion upon the state savings and loan commissioner to
determine what nonspecified activities may be undertaken, and
several state commissioners have authorized the sale of property
34
insurance by service corporations.
The validity of a commissioner's determination depends upon
whether the statutory delegation of legislative decision making
power contains adequate standards to guide the commissioner in
exercising his discretion. Statutes that confer authority upon the
commissioner without providing any standards are subject to
strong constitutional challenge. 3 5 When standards are provided,
however, it is difficult to determine how extensive they must be
for the delegation to be valid; a coherent definition of "adequate
tions doing business in the same state. See Weeks, "Tie-in" Legislation: A Triple-Edged Threat,
30 LEG. BULL 9, 18-19 (U.S. Sav. & Loan League 1964).
32. See, e.g., U.S. SAVINGS AND LOAN LEAGUE, MODEL SAVINGS ASSOCIATION ACT
§ 2(v) (1966).
33. CAL. FIN. CODE § 6702.1 (West 1968), ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 1514
(1974); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 175, § 174E (Supp. 1974); NEV. REV. STAT. § 673.2765(1)
(1973); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 384:16(b)(II) (Supp. 1973); N.Y. INS. LAW § 7-b (McKinney
Supp. 1974); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4811 (Supp. 1974). Compare notes 13 and 15 supra.
34. At least eight commissioners have done so. Letter from Richard W. Koeb, Superintendent of Banks, State Banking Department, Arizona, May 29. 1974; Letter from J.J.
Battaglia, Chief Examiner, Office of the Savings and Loan Commissioner, Illinois, May
27, 1974; Letter from Richard E. Wiles, Supervisor, Building and Loan Division, Department of Financial Institutions, Indiana, May 24, 1974; Letter from Clement S. Ruf,
Deputy Supervisor, State Banking Department, Louisiana, May 27, 1974; Letter from
Thomas H. Eminizer, Director, Department of Licensing and Regulation, Division of
Building, Savings and Loan Associations, Maryland, June 3, 1974; Letter from Anna I.
Coppin, Acting Supervisor, Division of Savings and Loan Supervision, Department of
Business Administration, Missouri, June 3, 1974; Letter from Douglas J. Westervelt,
Chief Examiner, Division of Building and Loan Associations, Department of Commerce,
Ohio, June 4, 1974; Letter from William R. Hotz, General Counsel, Office of Commissioner of Savings and Loan, Wisconsin, June 11, 1974. These letters, and all other letters
cited in this comment, are on file at The University of Chicago Law Review.
35. State courts have invoked the doctrine of unconstitutional delegation to invalidate,
or to construe narrowly, statutory grants of discretion that are overly vague. See, e.g., Krol
2d 587, 592-93, 233 N.E.2d 417, 420 (1968) (law vesting standardv. County of Will, 38 Ill.
less power in Health Authority to approve sewage treatment systems declared void); Clean
Air Constituency v. California State Air Resources Bd., 11 Cal. 3d 801, 817-20, 523 P.2d
617, 626-28, 114 Cal. Rptr. 577, 586-88 (1974) (pollution control law construed not to
authorize administrator to delay enforcement on theory that delay would constitute a
fundamental policy decision made without statutory standards).
At least two state service corporation investment statutes provide no explicit standard
for authorizing service corporation activities. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 369.219(6) (Supp. 1974);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 6020-162(n) (Supp. 1974).

The University of Chicago Law Review

[42:182

standards" has thus far eluded the state courts. 36 At least some
courts have construed the requirement broadly, upholding legis37
lation providing only extremely nonspecific standards.
It could also be argued that a commissioner would lack authority to permit service corporations to sell property insurance in
states that have enacted antirebate statutes, controlled business
statutes, or primary occupation statutes. But if the application of
antirebate and controlled business statutes to savings arid loan associations that sell insurance themselves is unjustified in light of
the purpose of the statutes, they should not be applied to prevent
the sale of property insurance by service corporations, since the
same dilution of commissions through distribution of earnings
would occur. Furthermore, although primary occupation statutes
directly prohibit savings and loans from acting as insurance agents,
it is possible to structure the activities of a service corporation to
38
enable it to escape that prohibition.
Thus, in the seven states that expressly prohibit service corporations from selling property insurance, in eight others that require an insurance agent applicant to be a natural person, 39 and
in those other states in which statutes permitting authorization of
1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 2.07 (1958).
37. See, e.g., Sleepy Hollow Lake, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 43 App. Div. 2d 439,
444, 352 N.Y.S.2d 274, 278-79 (1974) ("public interest" held adequate standard); Commonwealth v. Cherney, 454 Pa. 285, 291-92 & n.11, 312 A.2d 38, 41-42 & n.11 (1973)
("safety" held adequate, citing other cases holding "best interest of educational system"
and "blighted" adequate).
Some courts have substituted a requirement of procedural and judicial safeguards
against improper agency action for the adequate standards requirement. See, e.g.,
Motyka v. McCorkle, 58 N.J. 165, 177-78, 276 A.2d 129, 135-36 (1971). See generally
Davis, A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 713, 725-30 (1969).
38. But the settled rule prohibiting use of the corporate device to circumvent legislative policy might preclude property insurance activity by service corporations. See Washington Agency v. Insurance Comm'r, 309 Mich. 683, 16 N.W.2d 121 (1944) (license of
corporate insurance agent revoked where agent's shareholders owned national bank and
state and federal law prohibited national bank from obtaining license directly). See also 1
W. FLETCHER, supra note 9, § 41; Note, Is The Problem of DisregardingThe Corporate Entity
More a Question of Law than of Fact? 11 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 294, 298-302 (1937).
Where, however, there is clear evidence of a legislative intent that service corporations
be allowed to sell property insurance, service corporation statutes may be construed as
impliedly repealing prior restrictions that might have been interpreted to prevent these
corporations from acting as insurance agents, although there is a strong presumption
against repeal by implication. See Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357
(1963); State ex rel. Galloway v. Industrial Comm'n, 134 Ohio 496, 499-500, 17 N.E.2d 918
(1938); IA J.G. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 23.10 (4th ed.
1973).
39. But compare Mo. ANN. STAT. § 375.016(1) (1968) (natural person requirement),
with Letter from Anna 1. Coppin, Acting Supervisor, Division of Savings and Loan Supervision, Department of Business Administration, Missouri, June 3, 1974 (enclosing depart36.
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insurance sales by state savings and loan commissioners are subject to invalidation as unconstitutional delegations of legislative
power, savings and loan service corporations are prohibited from
acting as insurance agents.
3. Subsidiaries of Savings and Loan Holding Companies as Insurance Agents. The Savings and Loan Holding Company Amendments of 1967 (Holding Company Amendments) 40 authorize a
42
holding company41 to operate subsidiaries that sell insurance.
But the effect of these Amendments on existing state regulation
of the sale of property insurance by state chartered savings and
loan associations is governed by section 2(b) of the McCarran4
Ferguson Insurance Regulation Act (McCarran-Ferguson Act) ,'
which provides that no federal statute shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede state statutes that regulate the
business of insurance unless the federal statute itself "specifically
relates to the business of insurance. 4 4 In SEC v. National Securiment Regulations that expressly allow service corporations to act as insurance agents,
but limit service corporations' powers to those permitted under state law). Compare Wis.
STAT. ANN. §§ 209.04(1), (6) (Supp. 1974) (natural person requirement), with Letter from
William R. Hotz, General Counsel, Office of Commissioner of Savings and Loan, Wisconsin, June 11, 1974 (enclosing Guidelines that indicate that a service corporation may own
and operate an insurance agency).
40. 12 U.S.C. § 1730a (1970).
41. By the end of 1966, there were 98 holding companies controlling 134 associations.
These associations controlled 12.5 percent of the assets in the savings and loan industry.
Hearings on S. 1542 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., IstSess.
25 (1967). All controlled savings and loan subsidiaries are state chartered. Letter from
Charles E. Allen, General Counsel, Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Washington, D.C.,
June 6, 1974. See also NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE AGENTS, STUDY OF INSURANCE
AGENCY ACTIVITIES OF SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS 18-19 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as NAIA STUDY].
42. The Holding Company Amendments distinguish between a savings and loan holding company and a multiple savings and loan holding company; the former controls "an
insured institution" while the latter controls "two or more insured institutions." 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1730a(a)(1)(D), (E) (1970). An insured institution is one whose accounts are insured
by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC). 12 U.S.C. § 1724(a)
(1970). Approximately sixty-six percent of all state chartered associations controlling
almost ninety-four percent of the assets held by state chartered associations, are FSLICinsured. See FACT BOOK, supra note 1, at 57-58. Although the Holding Company Amendments contain a provision restricting the activity of multiple holding companies, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1730a(c)(2) (1970). they expressly allow a multiple holding company to control a noninsured subsidiary that sells insurance. Id. § 1730a(c)(2)(B). There are no provisions in
the Holding Company Amendments that either permit or prohibit an insured subsidiary
of a multiple savings and loan company, or any subsidiary of a holding company controlling
only one insured institution, from engaging in this activity.
43. Act of Mar. 9, 1945, ch. 20, § 2(b), 59 Stat. 34, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b)
(1970).
44. Id. See Hamilton Life Ins. Co. v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co.. 408 F.2d 606, 611
(2d Cir. 1969).
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ties, Inc., 45 the Supreme Court noted that the core of the "business
of insurance" is the relationship between the insurance company
and the policyholder. 46 Thus, although the Holding Company
Amendments relate to "insurance" in that they authorize control over subsidiaries that act as insurance agents, they do not
relate to the "business of insurance" within the meaning of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act. The central concern of the Amendments is the regulation of the investment activities of holding
companies, not the licensing of insurance agents, which the Court
47
held to be an activity within the business of insurance.
Consequently, if a state statute prohibits the issuance of an insurance agent license to the subsidiary of a savings and loan holding company, the state statute governs, and the Holding Company
Act Amendments' authorization of investment in insurance agent
subsidiaries could not be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede it. Moreover, a savings and loan holding company would
be unable to operate an insurance agent subsidiary in states that
merely prohibit a savings and loan association from investing in
a service corporation that sells insurance. The Holding Company Amendments explicitly prohibit a savings and loan holding
company and its subsidiaries other than insured savings and loans
from performing services for the purpose or with the effect of
evading state laws or regulations applicable to insured subsidiaries
of the holding company.4 8

45. 393 U.S. 453 (1960).
46. Id. at 460.
47. Id.
48. 12 U.S.C. § 1730a(c)(1) (1970). Ownership of an insurance agency by a savings and
loan holding company is apparently common. See Hearings on S. 1542 Before the Senate
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 85 (1967) (testimony that nine of the
ten member holding companies of the Council of Savings and Loan Stock Companies
controlled at least one insurance agency subsidiary).
More than eighty percent of the assets controlled by savings and loan holding companies
are located in California. S. REP. No. 354, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1967). Although no
California statute prohibits a non-savings and loan subsidiary from selling insurance,
see CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 11500-11650 (West 1968), §§ 11700-11708 (West Supp. 1974), the
state's insurance agent licensing statutes prevent both a savings and loan, CAL. FIN. CODE
§ 5500 (West 1968), and its service corporations, CAL. FIN. CODE § 6702.1 (West 1968),
from obtaining licenses. Thus, permitting a savings and loan holding company to operate
a non-savings and loan subsidiary that sells insurance would circumvent the state's policy
against insurance sales by savings and loan associations and their service corporations
and should be prohibited. Cf. Jackson v. First Nat'l Bank, 430 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 947 (1971) (one bank holding company forced to give up its armored
car service because ownership of that service by a bank would have violated the state's
branch banking laws).
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Federal Associations

1. The Association as an Insurance Agent. The Home Owners'
Loan Act of 1933, 4 9 which provides for the incorporation and
regulation of federal savings and loan associations,5" does not
specifically authorize a federal association to function as an insurance agent. Nor does the Act expressly grant a federal association those incidental powers reasonably necessary to accomplish
its express objects and purposes. 5 1 The Federal Home Loan Bank
Board (FHLBB) has construed its own powers under the Act as
including the power to grant federal associations a wide range of
incidental powers, 5 2 but it has interpreted those powers to exclude the authority to sell property insurance. 53 As a result,
federally chartered savings and loan associations, constituting
almost thirty-nine percent of all associations and holding fiftysix percent of the industry's assets, 54 are prohibited from acting
as property insurance agents.
2. Investment in a Service Corporation that Functions as an Insurance Agent. The Home Owners' Loan Act was amended in 1964
generally to allow federal associations to invest in service corporations, 55 and the FHLBB has issued a regulation specifically authorizing investment by a federal association in a service corporation
that markets property insurance. 5 6 This regulation, however, can49. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461 etseq. (1970).
50. All federal associations receive their charters from the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board (FHLBB), 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (1970), and are organized in mutual corporate form.
12 U.S.C. § 1464(b)(1) (1970); 12 C.F.R. § 544.1 (1974). These associations are required
to have their accounts insured by the FSLIC, 12 U.S.C. § 1726(b) (1970), and they automatically become members of the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) system, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1464(f) (1970), which serves as a central bank to supplement the resources of member
associations. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1429-31 (1970).
51. This is in contrast to Congress's specific grant to national banks of "all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking .
12 U.S.C.
§ 24 (1970).
52. See 12 C.F.R. § 544.1 (1974) (FHLBB charter provision regulations). An earlier
charter (Charter K), under which many federal associations still operate, also grants
similarly broad powers. See 24 C.F.R. § 202.9(a) (1938).
53. Opinion of Legal Department, FHLBB, May 26, 1936, excerpted in NAIA STUDY,
supra note 41, at 10; Letter from Charles E. Allen, General Counsel, FHLBB, Washington,
D.C., June 6, 1974. See Goodman v. Perpetual Bldg. Ass'n, 320 F. Supp. 20, 28 (D.D.C.
1970) (dictum). There is an indication in some FHLBB opinion letters, however, that an
association could operate as an agent if no other reasonable means to insure the property
securing the loan were available. See NAIA STUDY, supra note 41, at 10-12.
54. See FACT BOOK, supra note 1, at 58.
55. Act of Sept. 2, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-560, tit. IX, § 905, 78 Stat. 805, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1464(c) (1970).
56. 12 C.F.R. § 545.9-1(a)(4)(xi) (1974).
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not authorize a federal association to invest in a service corporation that markets property insurance if state chartered associations
in the state in which the federal association is domiciled lack comparable investment authority.
The 1964 amendment, as originally introduced, 57 contained a
provision authorizing federal associations to invest in service corporations subject to "rules and regulations of the Board ..

*"58

59
The "rules and regulations" limitation was eventually deleted,
thus clearly indicating that Congress had no intention of giving
the FHLBB the authority to limit a federal association's power to
invest in a service corporation. Under the amendment, a federal
association was to have the same power to invest in a service corporation as a state association doing business in the same jurisdic60

tion .

Moreover, the 1964 amendment of the Home Owners' Loan
Act, like the Savings and Loan Holding Company Amendments
of 1967,61 is not a statute regulating the business of insurance
within the meaning of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. The 1964
57. H.R. 12175, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964). The bill was introduced on July 30, 1964.
110 CONG. REC. 17479 (1964).
58. 110 CONG. REc. 19332 (1964). The amendment originated in a 1961 bill introduced by Representative Addonizio of New Jersey. H.R. 8647, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961);
107 CONG. REc. 15393 (1961). Although that bill would have been applicable to all federal
savings and loan associations, it was introduced in response to a particular problem that
existed in New Jersey. Federal associations in that state had no authority to invest in the
Central Corporation of Savings and Loan Associations, which was wholly owned by state
chartered associations and which provided member associations with various services
related to mortgage transactions. Lefcoe & Dobson, Savings Associations as Land Developers, 75 YALE L.J. 1271, 1292 n.74 (1966).
59. 110 CONG. REC. 19332-33 (1964). The limitation on the size of authorized investments was also reduced from two percent to one percent of the association's assets,
thereby allegedly reducing the need for FHLBB restriction of a federal association's
service corporation activities. Id.
Although both the House and Senate committee reports indicate an intention to limit
service corporation activities, H.R. REP. No. 1703, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1964), S. REP.
No. 1265, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1964), both reports had been completed before the
elimination of the "rules and regulations" clause. See HousE REPORT, supra at 27; SENATE
REPORT, supra at 54.
60. 110 CONG. REC. 19333 (1964) (remarks of Representative Widnall, sponsor of the
amendment). Congress had in other cases limited service corporation powers by express
statutory provisions. The Bank Corporation Act, for example, limits the function of certain bank service corporations to clerical and data processing services. Pub. L. 87-856,
Oct. 23, 1962, §§ (1)(c), (b), 76 Stat. 1132, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1861(c), (b) (1970). In fact, Congress never enacted H.R. 8245, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5 (1963), a bill that would have
limited the service corporation activity of FSLIC-insured savings and loan associations
to the clerical and data processing services permitted under the Bank Service Corporation Act. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1861(b), 1864 (1970).
61. See text and notes at notes 40-48 supra.
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amendment authorizes federal associations to undertake certain
investment activity and makes no attempt to regulate the licensing of insurance agents. Thus, it is not open to a construction,
either on its face or under regulations promulgated by the
FHLBB, 62 that would impair state insurance agent licensing laws.
As a result, a federal association cannot operate a service corporation that sells property insurance if the state in which it is domiciled prohibits a service corporation from selling property insurance.

63

II.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

Although several state insurance agent licensing statutes may
apply indirectly to savings and loan associations, their service
corporations, and their holding company subsidiaries, this comment has argued that such regulations should be construed to
permit the sale of property insurance by these parties. Other regulations directly prohibit the sale of property insurance by state
and federally chartered associations and their service corporations. There are several policy grounds that would support the
elimination of these restrictions.
The sale of property insurance by a savings and loan association or an affiliate located on its premises, for example, provides
increased convenience to the consumer. 64 The purchase of a
home 65 usually requires three transactions: the procurement of a
mortgage, the actual purchase of the real estate, and the purchase
of property insurance. If the savings and loan association acting
as mortgagee is permitted to sell the insurance, the consumer's
purchase would require only two transactions. 66 Integration of
62. See 12 C.F.R. § 545.9-1(a)(4)(xi) (1974).
63. See statutes cited at notes 14 & 33 supra. The only court holding that a federal
association may invest in a service corporation that sells property insurance noted that
a state association in that jurisdiction had the same investment powers. People ex rel,
Troxell v. Baylor, 15 Ill. App. 3d 815, 820, 305 N.E.2d 15, 19 (1973).
64. At least one commentator has attributed the success of savings and loan management-owned agencies that operate on the association's premises in part to the fact that
customers find it more convenient to use an agency on the premises than to patronize an
agency at a different location. See Herman, supra note 4, at 854.
65. The typical savings and loan borrower is an individual homeowner. At the end
of 1973, about seventy-five percent of the mortgage loans held by FSLIC-insured associations were secured by single-family homes. FACT BOOK, supra note 1, at 78.
66. But it has also been argued that "one-stop shopping" may result in fragmentation of the insurance buying process, that is, purchase of part of a customer's insurance
needs from one agent and part from another. The alleged result of fragmentation is that
the customer purchases more coverage than he needs or buys inadequate coverage. Even
if this were true, one solution would be to allow a financial institution to sell all types of
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the loan purchase with the insurance transaction may also reduce
the total cost of providing insurance. Certain information required in mortgage transactions is used in preparing insurance
policies, and costs would be reduced whenever the loan personnel
could use the initial information to determine the insurable value
67
of the property.
Elimination of restrictions on insurance sales by savings and
loan associations will probably increase the number of competing
insurance agents, and this increased competition may benefit
the consumer. First, it may result in an increase in the quality of
various services, such as analysis of client needs, recommendation
for coverage, selection of an insurer, and assistance in claim settlement at the time of loss. Second, if increased competition among
agents results in a reduction in the size of their commissions, it
68
will probably lead to lower premium charges.
Although these potential benefits of allowing savings and loan
associations to act as insurance agents may justify elimination of
the various existing licensing restrictions, it provides no justification for allowing savings and loan associations, if they can legally
act as agents, to condition the extension of a property loan on the
purchase of insurance from the association or an affiliated
agency. 6 9 There has been some dispute over whether tying arrangements should be viewed as an exclusionary practice or as a
monopoly profit maximization device;7 0 nevertheless, they are
generally recognized as having anticompetitive effects. Over
twenty-five states have already enacted statutes that prohibit coninsurance and thus serve all of a customer's insurance needs, rather than to prohibit
the institutipn from selling any insurance. Hearings on the Credit Crunch and Reform of
FinancialInstitutions Before the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. 2, at 867-68 (1973) (testimony of Emmett J. Vaughan).
67. Butseeid. at 870-71.
68. For an indication that an increasing number of property insurers feel it necessary
to reduce commission expenses in order to maintain prices competitive with other firms,
see Kobler, The Florida Manifesto Manifest, 74 BEST'S

REVIEW

(Property/Liability)

14

(1974). For a discussion of the increasing competition in property lines, see NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION

OF INSURANCE

COMMISSIONERS,

MONITORING

COMPETITION:

A

MEANS

OF

66-70 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
NAIC STUDY]; Rose, State Regulation of Property and Casualty Insurance Rates, 28 OHIO ST.
REGULATING THE PROPERTY AND

LIABILITY BUSINESS

L.J. 669, 720-24 (1967); Rose, Regulation of Property and Casualty Insurance Rates in Ohio,
32 OHIo ST. L.J. 487, 502-03 (1971).
69. These tying arrangements are common in the savings and loan industry. See
Herman, supra note 4, at 854-55; Kimball & Jackson, supra note 7, at 155.

70. See Posner, Exclusionary Practices and the Antitrust Laws, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 506,
508-15 (1974). See also Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J.
19, 21-23 (1957); Burstein, A Theory of Full-Line Forcing, 55 Nw. U.L. REV. 62, 63-64
(1960); Burstein, The Economics of Tie-in Sales, 42 REV. EcON. & STAT. 68 (1960).
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ditioning the extension of credit upon the purchase of insurance at a designated agency.7 1 Similar federal regulations have
been proposed to prohibit the use of tying arrangements by
FSLIC-insured institutions.7 2 The federal antitrust laws may also
be applicable, since the McCarran-Ferguson Act expressly provides that they apply to the business of insurance to the extent
that such business is not regulated by state law. 73 The coverage of

federal antitrust laws, however, is limited.7 4 Moreover, any statutes prohibiting tying arrangements are difficult to enforce beuse of subtle coercion rather
cause of the apparently widespread
5
7

than explicit tying requirements.

71. NAIC STUDY, supra note 68, at 228. See, e.g., CAL INS. CODE § 770 (West
1968); MicH. STAT. ANN. § 24.12077 (1972); N.Y. INS. LAW § 7-a (McKinney Supp. 1973).
72. Proposed Ins. Reg. § 563.35(a)(1), 39 Fed. Reg. 42390 (1974).
73. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1970). One federal court has held that federal antitrust laws
apply without limitation, since the fact that an insurance policy is the tied product does
not bring the tying arrangement within the meaning of the "business of insurance," nor
therefore within exclusive state regulation under the Act. Fry v. John Hancock Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 355 F. Supp. 1151, 1154 (N.D. Tex. 1973); see SEC v. National Securities
Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 458-60 (1969). But see Note, Federal Regulation of Insurance Companies:
The DisappearingMcCarranAct Exemption, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1340, 1352-54.
74. Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970), is probably inapplicable, since
money-lending is not one of the underlying transactions covered by the Act. See United
States v. Investor Diversified Servs., Inc., 102 F. Supp. 645, 647-49 (D. Minn. 1952),
67,799, at
vacated on other grounds by consent decree, TRADE REG. RE'. (1954 Trade Cas.)
69,574 (D. Minn. June 30, 1954). Section 5(a)(6) of the Federal Trade Commission Act,
15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(6) (1970), which prohibits unfair methods of competition and unfair
or deceptive acts or practices, specifically exempts banks from its coverage. One court
has held that the reason for the exemption was that banks are subject to the direction and
control of a separate commission largely similar to that of the Federal Trade Commission. T.C. Hurst & Son v. FTC, 268 F. 874, 877 (E.D. Va. 1920). This rationale has equal
force when applied to federal savings and loan associations. The FHLBB has powers over
federal asociations similar to those exercised by the Federal Reserve Board over national
banks, see T. MARVELL, THE FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK BOARD 20, 57 (1969), and the
FSLIC plays a role analogous to that of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. See
id. at 5, 84-86. Moreover, seventy-one percent of all state associations, controlling ninetyfive percent of the assets held by state asociations, are subject to federal regulation either
as a member of the FHLB system, or as an FSLIC-insured institution as well. See FACT
BOOK, supra note 1, at 57-58, 111-12; 12 U.S.C. §§ 1464(a), 1725(a) (1970).
Finally, section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970), may have only minimal impact on these tying arrangements because it has been interpreted to require that the
violator have had substantial market power over the tying product and have restrained
a not insubstantial amount of interstate commerce. See Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. U.S.
Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969); Spens v. Citizens Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 364 F. Supp.
1161, 1164 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (individual savings and loan associations had insufficient
economic power over loans, the tying product). But cf. Stavrides v. Mellon Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co., 353 F. Supp. 1072, 1076-77 (W.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd, 487 F.2d 953 (3d Cir.
1973).
75. Associations rarely declare explicitly that the borrower has to purchase the required insurance through a designated agency to obtain the loan; the lender probably
relies more upon subtle hints. Herman, supra note 4, at 854-855; Kimball & Jackson,
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CONCLUSION

Insurance agent licensing regulations that exist in some states
may restrict the sale of property insurance by savings and loan
associations and affiliated agencies. This comment has argued
that elimination of those restrictions would lead to increased convenience, better service, and lower insurance rates for the consumer. The strongest argument against elimination of- these restrictions is that savings and loan associations, if permitted to sell
insurance freely, can use subtle pressures in a tight credit market
to force the mortgagor to purchase his property insurance
through the savings and loan association or an affiliated agency
rather than through another agent. But the risk of anticompeitive effects of these tying arrangements can be reduced through
more effective enforcement of existing statutes or by other
methods such as increasing competition among loan associations
by allowing additional entry into the industry. It would be anomalous indeed to attempt to prevent these anticompetitive effects
by maintaining direct restrictions on competition.
Jonathan Kahn

supra note 7, at 156. Proving subtle coercion is extremely difficult if the borrower signs a
statement conceding that the lender allowed him free choice in the selection of an insurance agent. These forced confessions of "free will" have actually enabled some lenders
completely to circumvent statutes that prohibit tying arrangements. See Herman, supra note
4, at 855 n.9.

